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PUBLIC RIGHTS, SOCIAL EQUALITY,
AND THE CONCEPTUAL ROOTS
OF THE PLESSY CHALLENGE
Rebecca J. Scott*

This Article argues that the test case that gave rise to the 1896 decision in Plessy v. Ferguson is best understood as part of a wellestablished,cosmopolitan traditionof anticaste activism in Louisiana
rather than as a quixotic effort that contradicted nineteenth-century
ideas of the boundaries of citizens' rights. By drawing a dividing
line between civil and political rights, on the one hand, and social
rights, on the other, the Supreme Court construed challenges to segregation as claims to a "social equality" that was beyond the scope
of judicially cognizable rights. The Louisiana constitutional convention of 1867-68, however, had defined citizens' rights within a
quite different typology, conferring a state constitutional guarantee
to all citizens of the same "civil, political, and public rights," and
providing the basis for successful litigation againstforced separation on public transportation and in public accommodations.
Understanding this "public rights" construct, and Louisiana's
eleven-year experience under the 1868 state constitution, enables us
to see Homer Plessy's challenge to Louisiana'sSeparate CarLaw as
emerging within a complex exchange of ideas and practices among
activists who traced their ancestry to Africa, the United States,
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France, and Haiti. Far from being visionary or anachronistic, the
Plessy challenge was solidly grounded in time and place. It drew
upon both a dense social network of urban and rural supporters,
and a creative line of vernacularpolitical thought.
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The citizens of this State ...shall enjoy the same civil, political, and public rights and privileges, and be subject to the same pains and penalties.
Louisiana Constitution of 1868'
Slavery not only introduced the rule of caste but prescribed its conditions,
in the interests of that institution. The trace of color raised the presumption
of bondage and was a bar to citizenship. The law in question [the Separate
Car Law] is an attempt to apply this rule to the establishment of legalized
caste-distinctionamong citizens.
Brief of the plaintiff in error, filed April 6, 1893,
Plessy v. Ferguson
INTRODUCTION

In 1892, the Louisiana Supreme Court ruled that when Homer Plessy refused to give up his seat in a whites-only, first-class train carriage he was
displaying an "unreasonable insistence upon thrusting the company of one
race upon the other, with no adequate motive."' In 1896, the U.S. Supreme
Court agreed that the citizenship granted by the Fourteenth Amendment contained no grounds on which to assert a right to the "social equality" that they
claimed Homer Plessy's refusal of legally mandated segregation implied. Indeed, Justice Henry Billings Brown declared that "in the nature of things" the
Amendment could not have been intended to "enforce" social equality.4 The

1.

LA. CONST. tit. I, art. 11(1868).

2.

163 U.S. 537 (1896).

3.

Exparte Plessy, 11 So. 948, 951 (La. 1892). The decision is also excerpted in THE THIN
71-74 (Otto H. Olsen ed., 1967).

DISGUISE: TURNING POINT IN NEGRO HISTORY

4. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 544 (1896) ("[Iln the nature of things [the Fourteenth
Amendment] could not have been intended to abolish distinctions based upon color, or to enforce
social, as distinguished from political equality, or a commingling of the two races upon terms unsatisfactory to either.").
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Court therefore ruled that the legislature of the State of Louisiana had not
violated the U.S. Constitution when it passed a statute that obliged railroad
companies to provide "equal but separate" railway cars and to have their
agents assign passengers to one or another car based on race.' Homer
Plessy's contrasting claim that the statute in question established "an insidious distinction and discrimination between citizens of the United States,
based on race, which is obnoxious to the fundamental principles of national
6
citizenship" thus failed.
Precisely because the Plessy decision appears, in retrospect, to have
been both repellent and consequential, it often seems to tempt constitutional
analysts to shift a portion of the burden for its most repellent aspects onto
what is imagined to be "the historical context." In turning to the historical
record to illuminate the Plessy case, legal scholars have characteristically
asked a set of broad questions derived from the language of the decision:
Did the drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment indeed mean to include "social equality," or racial integration, as a component of citizenship? Was
racial segregation perhaps already a well-established norm, rendering the
decision a mere formality? And most importantly, could one have expected
any other outcome from within a society so pervaded with racism of various
kinds?
While deploring the decision in Plessy, analysts often come up with answers that hew rather closely to the framing proposed in the majority
opinion. After examining the complexity of the debates and maneuvering
surrounding the drafting of the Fourteenth Amendment, William Nelson
concludes that the Reconstruction Congress had not resolved "the question
whether the Fourteenth Amendment permits or prohibits segregation."' In
Nelson's view, the judges in Plessy should not be charged with racism for
having chosen to interpret an indeterminate doctrine in a way that conformed to the pressures of the time.8 Michael Klarman argues that the
decision in Plessy "simply mirrored the preferences of most white Americans" and that a contrary decision could hardly be expected unless a strong
social movement had existed that could support a campaign against segregation.9 Owen Fiss views the outcome of the case as doctrinally "a foregone
conclusion," and characterizes Homer Plessy's attorney as a visionary and a

5.
Id. at 552. "Equal but separate" rather than "separate but equal" is the precise wording of
the statute. Act of May 12, 1890, No. 111, 1890 La. Acts 152.
6.

Ex parte Plessy, I I So. at 949.

7.

WILLIAM
JUDICIAL DOCTRINE

8.

E. NELSON, THE
186-87 (1988).

FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL PRINCIPLE TO

Id.

9.
MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND
THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 22 (2004) [hereinafter KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL
RIGHTS]; see also Michael Klarman, The Plessy Era, 1998 SUP. CT. REV. 303.
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legal Don Quixote whose "conception of citizenship" was "shaky." Charles
Lofgren views the decision as in keeping with "the spirit of the age. '
In these formulations, "historical context" takes on an almost fatalistic
explanatory value. Michael Klarman thus writes, "Justices in the Plessy era
were too immersed in their historical context to spot the oppression that historical hindsight can readily see in racial practices at the turn of the
twentieth century."" This is, I will argue, an unnecessarily impoverished
way of thinking about the relationship of law and historical inquiry. For one
thing, the bog of determinism versus contingency is a famously deep one,
generally better skirted than plunged into. 2 After a certain point, most things
"have to" turn out more or less the way they turned out-but this hardly
means that we are bound from the outset to accept the terms of the actual
decision as defining the parameters of the possible in a given society. Moreover, invoking the larger "historical context" to argue that rights-denying
court decisions were largely epiphenomenal seems oddly ahistorical: as
those who fought over the legislation were well aware, law was an absolutely crucial component of formal segregation, and formal segregation was
a linchpin of the conscious political project of white supremacy. This is why
the Plessy challenge drew the energies of equal-rights activists for many
years, even as they recognized the high probability of losing the case."
The dialogue between historians and legal scholars is productive precisely because historical context is not simply a backdrop, a stage setting, or
an external force pressing judicial events in one direction or another. A full
historical context incorporates wide networks of social interaction and situates legal and other initiatives within shared and competing structures of
discourse in order to illuminate the origins of a case as well as its meanings
actors. 14 Knowing that the 1890s were marked by pervasive
for different
racism, or that the Republican Party was becoming more conservative, or

10.

OWEN

357, 362 (1993);

M. FISS,
CHARLES

TROUBLED BEGINNINGS OF THE MODERN

STATE,

1888-1910, at 354,

A. LOFGREN, THE Plessy CASE: A LEGAL-HISTORICAL INTERPRETATION

197 (1987).
11.
KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 9, at 58. For alternate perspectives, see Matthew D. Lassiter, Does the Supreme Court Matter?-Civil Rights and the Inherent
Politicizationof Constitutional Law, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1401 (2005), and Kenneth W. Mack, Rethinking Civil Rights Lawyering and Politics in the Era Before Brown, 115 YALE L.J. 256 (2005).

12.
On the metaphor of the "Serbonian bog," see JOHN MILTON, PARADISE LOST 46 (Merritt
Y. Hughes ed., Bobbs-Merrill Educ. Publ'g. 1983) (1667). For law-related use of the metaphor, see
Landress v. Phoenix Mutual Life Isurance Co.. 291 U.S. 491, 499 (1934) (Cardozo, J., dissenting),
and JOHN FABIAN WITT, THE ACCIDENTAL REPUBLIC: CRIPPLED WORKINGMEN, DESTITUTE WIDOWS, AND THE REMAKING OF AMERICAN LAW 20-21 (2004).
For the contrary view, see KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 9, at
13.
59. who argues that "[m]ost Jim Crow laws merely described white supremacy; they did not produce
it."

The term "mutually constitutive" is often invoked to denote this back-and-forth between
14.
law and other forms of action, in which the distinction between "law" and "society" is intentionally
blurred. The elegant and now classic inanifesto for one variant of this approach is Robert W.
Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REV. 57 (1984). See also the discussion in the dossier
on history and law in Num6ro Sp6cial, Histoire et Droit, 57 ANNALES: HISTOIRE, SCIENCES SOCIALES 1425 (2002), especially Alain Boureau, Droit naturel et abstraction judiciaire: Hypotheses sur
la nature du droit ,nididval, 57 ANNALES: HISTOIRE, SCIENCES SOCIALES 1463 (2002).
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that "public opinion" did not endorse "social equality" does not really tell us
how the challenge was seen by Homer Plessy, his allies, and his enemies.
Such generalities do not capture the dynamics of their activism and the historical constraints upon it. The New Orleans Citizens' Committee for the
Annulment of the Separate Car Law set out to create a context, drawing
upon public practices, shared values, and social networks that now require
considerable digging to reconstruct. Tracing these ideas and practices, one
can see how a group of men and women built on their own understandings
of the past and deployed vernacular as well as formal concepts of equality.
Some among them may have been Quixotes, but more in the sense of citizens insisting on honorable conduct than in the sense of men and women
tilting at windmills. 5
In this Article I will argue that Homer Plessy's supporters-and his opponents, though they were only later to acknowledge it-envisioned his
legal challenge to a large extent as a claim to what the 1868 Louisiana Constitution had defined as public rights. That constitution, in force until 1879,
had assured all of the state's citizens access to the same "civil, political, and
public rights and privileges."' 6 For Plessy's fellow activists in New Orleans,
"public rights and privileges" were essential to the substance and symbolism
of the equal dignity of citizens in the public sphere. Moreover, a claim of
equal standing in public directly challenged the effort to impose white supremacy; it was not simply an expression of a preference for one rather than
another mode of assorting individuals on a train." "Social equality," by contrast, was a label their enemies had long attempted to pin on the proponents
of equal public rights in order to associate public rights with private intimacy and thereby to trigger the host of fears connected with the image of
black men in physical proximity to white women. To conflate the phrase
"social equality" with an imagined taxonomy of civil, political, and social
rights is to mistake an insult for an analytic exercise."
The argument of this Article will proceed in three steps. First, I will explore the process by which the concept of "public rights" made its way into
the 1868 Louisiana Constitution and the disparate historical traditions on
which the delegates to Louisiana's constitutional convention seem to have
drawn. Second, I will trace the public rights jurisprudence that emerged in
Louisiana in the early 1870s in response to a variety of cases brought by
men and women of color. I will also describe some of the ways ordinary
15.

1thank Roger Chartier for pointing out this alternate reading of the Quixote metaphor.

16.

LA. CONST.

tit.

I, art. 11 (1868).

17.
For an intriguing discussion of the interplay of public standing and social status in conservative thought in Britain after the French Revolution, see DON HERZOG, POISONING THE MINDS
OF THE LOWER ORDERS 414-546 (1998). For an explication of the dignitary content of the Plessy
case from the point of view of normative political philosophy, see Gerald J. Postema, Introduction:
The Sins of Segregation, 16 L. & PHIL. 221 (1997). Postema argues that segregation's core evil is the
public denial of the fundamental good of "status or standing as a full and equal member of one's
society." Id. at 241.
18. The language used in the Reconstruction-era struggle can be followed in the pages of the
New Orleans Tribune and the New Orleans Daily Crescent during late 1867 and early 1868.
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citizens of color in Louisiana acted on their claims to public standing after
the defeat of Reconstruction, thereby keeping alive in practice an idea that
was no longer part of the state's written law. Third, I will argue that in the
course of the Plessy challenge the idea of equal public rights developed into
a broad anticaste principle that sought to change the course of a rapidly narrowing Federal Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence.
From this perspective, the Louisiana Separate Car Law was not a mere
expression of deteriorating "race relations." It was part of a frontal attack by
white supremacists on the belief that the citizenship recognized by the Fourteenth Amendment-if not the Amendment itself-prohibited the state from
becoming complicit in public acts of disrespect. The anticaste principle expressed by Plessy's supporters encompassed the earlier concept of equal
public rights and constituted a reply to that attack. By fusing historical inquiry with doctrinal analysis across the three decades that linked the Plessy
challenge to the 1868 Constitution, we can thus reframe the interpretation of
the Plessy decision and situate it somewhat differently with respect to the
Fourteenth Amendment.
I.

WRITING PUBLIC RIGHTS INTO LAW

Louisiana's state constitutional convention of 1867-68 was a remarkable
conclave. Its members were elected in the tense aftermath of a murderous
1866 vigilante attack on white and black Republicans in which the police
appeared to be complicit. The behavior of local authorities in turn had
helped to discredit President Andrew Johnson's conciliatory policy toward
white Southerners and hastened the advent of congressional Reconstruction.' 9 Drawn from an electorate that included newly enfranchised male
former slaves, the convention comprised nearly equal numbers of men categorized as white and those categorized as black or of color.2 On the floor of
the convention, agrarian reform and women's rights were debated alongside
suffrage and the content of citizenship. In Louisiana's "constitutional moment," various delegates revealed a strong form of anticaste thinking that
had its roots in the cosmopolitan world of free men and women of color in
the Gulf Coast and the Caribbean and that was reinforced by the aspirations
of former slaves in Louisiana to a place in the politics and public culture of
the state'

19. These events were discussed in the New Orleans Tribune in the months surrounding July
of 1867, the first anniversary of the massacre at Mechanics' Hall.
20.

ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION:

AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION,

1863-1877, at

62-67, 262-63 (1988). A close analysis of the composition of the delegates is presented in chapter
six of TED TUNNELL, CRUCIBLE OF RECONSTRUCTION: WAR, RADICALISM AND RACE IN LOUISIANA,

1862-1877, at 111-35 (1984).
21.

Portions of the debate appear in OFFICIAL JOURNAL OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE CON-

VENTION, FOR FRAMING A CONSTITUTION FOR THE STATE OF LOUISIANA (1867-68) [hereinafter
OFFICIAL JOURNAL]. An overview of the legislature is provided in ROGER A. FISCHER, THE SEGREGATION STRUGGLE IN LOUISIANA, 1862-77, at 48-56 (1974).
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The phrase "public rights" was introduced into debate in the early weeks
of the convention. An initial draft of a proposed bill of rights, from a committee chaired by the former slaveholder Judge William H. Cooley,
proposed a brief text guaranteeing all citizens the "same civil and political
rights and privileges." This much even conservative Republicans understood
to be essential. A dissenting minority of the committee, including a schoolteacher of color from Ascension Parish named P. F. Valfroit, the shoemaker
Charles Leroy, and the former slave James H. Ingraham, immediately
counter-proposed a fuller text. In keeping with a longstanding radical
Republican belief that the Declaration of Independence was the foundation
upon which the U.S. Constitution should rest, the minority report argued
that the state constitution should begin by declaring that "all men are born
free and equal., 22 It should explicitly guarantee all citizens "the same public,
civil, and political rights and privileges."23
The origins of the phrase public rights are difficult to pin down. At least
three lines of thought came together to give meaning to the concept: longstanding conceptions of personal honor, French and Caribbean revolutionary
ideas of equality, and nineteenth-century European liberal codifications of
rights. Ideas of honor underlay the belief that forced separation on the basis
of color constituted what would today be called a dignitary injury. Egalitarian currents from the age of revolution provided a basis for arguing that all
citizens had a standing of equality incompatible with the imposition of such
dignitary injuries. And formal European political theory could be invoked to
argue that the state was obliged to guarantee what were alternatively characterized as "social rights" or "public rights."
An honor-based right to respect in public places can be traced far back in
the jurisprudence of ancien regime and colonial societies, though it was conferred only on certain members of such societies. In eighteenth-century
Spanish America, for example, a white man aggrieved by what he saw as the
insolent or importunate public behavior of a black slave could invoke not only
his own personal honor but also a public right or interest that was offended
when necessary hierarchies were thus publicly affronted.24 Once colonies became republics, free and freed men could argue that self-dishonoring public

22.

This concept of the Declaration was vividly expressed by both Charles Sumner and

Frederick Douglass. See

JOHN STAUFFER, THE BLACK

HEARTS

OF MEN: RADICAL ABOLITIONISTS

22-26 (2001). Some prewar state constitutions had done the
same, though the import of the phrase "free and equal" had been diminished by the decision in State
v. Post, 20 N.J.L. 368, 373-76, 378-86 (1845). For the successive draft wordings of the bill of
rights, see OFFICIAL JOURNAL, supra note 21, at 84-109, 116-117.
AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF RACE

23.

OFFICIAL JOURNAL,

supra note 2 1, at 96.

24. A case of this kind from colonial Peru is carefully analyzed in Tamara J. Walker, Ladies
and Gentlemen, Slaves, and Citizens: Dressing the Part in Lima, 1723-1854, at 142-43 (2007)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan) (on file with author). For a discussion of
honor, illegitimacy, and constructs of "the public," see ANN TWINAM, PUBLIC LIVES, PRIVATE SECRETS: GENDER, HONOR, SEXUALITY, AND ILLEGITIMACY IN COLONIAL SPANISH AMERICA 25-37
(1999).
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displays of deference should be a. thing of the past.25 But as long as slavery
existed, states generally continued to require public deference on the part of
those with apparent or known slave ancestry, in a mix of class and color
subordination thought essential to the maintenance of slavery itself. Free
people of color in antebellum Louisiana had been subjected to a particularly
exigent set of such required acts of deference, and relief from these humiliations was very much on the minds of many of the members of the 1867-68
convention 26
.
The fundamental idea of differential public standing had been challenged by the 1789 French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the
Citizen, which reflected a conscious assault on the allocation of rights and
privileges according to birth, rank, and estate. The Declaration did not directly address the question of equal access to public accommodation or
public transport, nor did it speak of color. But it reflected the dignitary dimension of public rights in declaring all citizens eligible for public office,
and it located such rights within the essential nature of human beings:
Article 6. The Law is the expression of the general will. All citizens have
the right to take part, personally or through their representatives, in its
making. It must be the same for all, whether it protects or punishes. All
citizens, being equal in its eyes, are equally eligible for all public honors,
positions, and employment [toutes dignits, places et emplois publics], according to their ability, and without any distinction other than their virtues
and talents.27
In late eighteenth-century France, the claim that all men had equal
standing in civil society was a powerful statement about the respect that
should be accorded to citizens, and a call for the state to protect basic liberties.1s In practice, however, the legislators of Revolutionary France
equivocated on the applicability of the Declaration of the Rights of Man to
the colonies, first holding back on the extension of civil equality to free men
of color, then conceding such equality and consenting to the abolition of
slavery, then reimposing slavery during the reign of Napoleon Bonaparte.2 9
25.

On the transformations of these concepts in the nineteenth century, see HONOR,
(Sueann Caulfield et al. eds., 2005).

STATUS,

AND LAW IN MODERN LATIN AMERICA

26. See CARYN Cossf BELL, REVOLUTION, ROMANTICISM AND THE AFRO-CREOLE PROTEST
TRADITION IN LOUISIANA, 1718-1868, at 222-75 (1997).
27. For the text of the Diclaration, see Louis TRIPIER, LES CONSTITUTIONS FRANgAISES 10
(1848). The term digniti evoked both merit and respect as well as honorableness. 1 DICTIONNAIRE
HISTORIQUE DE LA LANGUE FRANgAISE 1085 (Alain Rey et al. eds., 1998).
28. Within the droits de l'homme (rights of man) one finds the complementary concept
of libertds publiques (public liberties). For a mid-nineteenth-century discussion, see I DENIS
SERRIGNY, TRAIT9 DU DROIT PUBLIC DES FRAN4AIS, PRECEDE D'UNE INTRODUCTION SUR LES FONDEMENTS DES SOCI9TI9S POLITIQUES 287-88 (1846). See also JEAN-Luc AUBERT, INTRODUCTION AU
DU DROIT CIVIL § 56, at 47-48 (9th ed. 2002). The "rights of
man" can be seen to include the right to "public liberties." These do not translate directly as "public
rights," but could be so named in English.
DROIT ET THEMES FONDAMENTAUX

29.

See LAURENT DUBoIs, AVENGERS OF THE
(2004); JOHN D. GARRIGUS, BEFORE
SAINT-DOMINGUE (2006).
REVOLUTION

NEW WORLD: THE STORY OF THE HAITIAN
HAITI: RACE AND CITIZENSHIP IN FRENCH
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The most explicit assertion of the dignitary component of the claim to
equal rights came not from Paris, but from the colonies themselves. At the
* end of the eighteenth century, free men of color Vincent Og6 and Julien
Raimond from Saint-Domingue had allied with French abolitionists to advance the case for equal political rights for free men of color, and Raimond
became highly influential in the French National Assembly. Free men of
color had also carried their struggle to the battlefield, particularly in the
western part of Saint-Domingue. At Mirebalais in 1791, for example, "citizens of color" signed a "Concordat" with white colonists that obliged the
latter to recognize their "violated and misunderstood rights" and repudiated
"the progress of a ridiculous form of prejudice." These struggles overlapped
and sometimes conflicted with the struggle against slavery itself that culminated in Haitian independence in 1804.30
In France, the rise of the Empire under Napoleon Bonaparte and the
subsequent restoration of monarchical rule eclipsed many of the egalitarian
claims of the Declaration of the Rights of Man. By the time of the 1830
Revolution, however, some of the key ideas of the Declaration had been adjusted to fit France's constitutional monarchy, and the first formal use of the
precise phrase public rights seems to have come from a jurist writing in
Paris in the 1830s. Pellegrino Rossi, an exiled Italian federalist, had been
named by Minister Franqois Guizot to a chair of constitutional law at the
Collfge de France in the 1820s. Rossi developed a detailed theory that divided the rights of people living in a state of law into three categories:
private rights, public rights, and political rights.3' While political rights, in
Rossi's view, should be limited based on the different presumed capacities
of certain groups (hence, for example, denied to women, children, and the
insane), public rights should be open to all. 3' He judged privileges for private persons in the public domain to be impermissible.33
In 1846, the French jurist Denis Serrigny enumerated a set of "public
rights" that were absolute and belonged to all citizens. These rights were
constitutive of "social equality," including "the absence of castes which
place one portion of the members of the State into orders or classes from
which they cannot exit.' 34 By 1848, with the revolution that brought the
Second Republic, the previous reluctance to advocate full political equality
gave way to a more egalitarian picture of rights, yielding a final abolition of
slavery in the French colonies and an accompanying text that endorsed the
30. See DUBOIS, supra note 29, at 80-88, 119-20; LAURENT DUBOIS, A COLONY OF CITIZENS: REVOLUTION AND SLAVE EMANCIPATION IN THE FRENCH CARIBBEAN, 1787-1804 (2004);
GARRIGUS, supra note 29. For a synthesis, see Laurent Dubois, An Enslaved Enlightenment: Rethinking the Intellectual History of the French Atlantic, 31 Soc. HIST. 1 (2006).

31.
PARIS 9

32.

I P.
(1866).

Rossi, COURS DE DROIT CONSTITUTIONNEL PROFESSt A LA FACULT9 DE DROIT DE

Id. at 11-12.

33.

Id. This is one of many re-editions of a set of lectures dating originally to 1836. See
ii, 9-10, 45 (1968). I thank
Pasquale Pasquino for discussions of Rossi's history.
PHILIPPE BRAUD, LA NOTION DE LIBERTt PUBLIQUE EN DROIT FRAN(;AIS

34.

1 SERRIGNY, supra note 28, at 287-88.
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dignity of all citizens. Minister, Frangois Arago declared that law in the
colonies should henceforth make no distinctions that would violate the principle of "galit sociale" [social equality].35 In this context, the phrase
"social equality" had both a formal legal meaning and a positive, antiaristocratic resonance.
These European and colonial strands of public rights thinking were intellectually and socially available to the legislators of the 1867-68 Louisiana
constitutional convention. Louisiana had lived under Spanish rule for the
latter part of the eighteenth century, and everyone knew that how one was
treated in public constituted a measure-indeed, it was often the measureof one's honor. The transfer of the colony to France and then to the United
States brought a formal guarantee of the rights of U.S. citizenship, a guarantee quickly invoked by men of color who had served in the militia under
Spain. President Jefferson's refusal to honor this portion of the treaty did not
diminish the militia members' perception of themselves as honorable citi36
zens.
Both the French Revolution and the ideology of the revolutionary gens
de couleur of Saint-Domingue in the 1790s were thoroughly familiar to the
immigrant free people of color in New Orleans and to their descendantsincluding convention delegate Edouard Tinchant, whose mother, a SaintDomingue dmigrre, had settled in New Orleans and later migrated to
France.37 The French revolution of 1848 was also part of the lived experience of European radicals like the New Orleans newspaper editor JeanCharles Houzeau, a Belgian, and Edouard Tinchant, who had attended
38
school in the French town of Pau during 1848. Tinchant made the connection quite clear, explaining that his father had left antebellum Louisiana for
France in order to raise his six sons "in a country where no infamous laws or
stupid prejudices could prevent them from becoming MEN."'3 9
In Reconstruction New Orleans, the claim to equal "public rights," with
its strong implication of equal access to public accommodations and public
transport, brought the Louisiana legislators into bitterly disputed territory.
Rossi, writing in France in the 1830s, had treated the terms "public rights"
35. See MAURICE AGULHON, 1848 OU L'APPRENTISSAGE DE LA RIPUBLIQUE, 1848-1852 ch.
1 (1973). The 1848 abolition decree spoke of dignitd. See D'UNE ABOLITION, L'AUTRE: ANTHOLOGIE

RAISONNIE

DE

TEXTES

CONSACRI9S

.;

LA

SECONDE

ABOLITION

DE

L'ESCLAVAGE

DANS LES

17-19 (Myriam Cottias ed., 1998). Arago's instructions were Portant instructions pour l'exrcution du drcret du 27 avril 1848, Circulaire Ministrielle No. 358 of May 7, 1848,
Bulletin Officiel de la Martinique [Official Bulletin of Martinique], May 7, 1848, p. 594.
COLONIES FRANAISES

36.

See

BELL,

supra note 26, at 29-34;

IRA BERLIN, GENERATIONS OF CAPTIVITY:

TORY OF AFRICAN-AMERICAN SLAVES 51-96 (2003); KIMBERLY S. HANGER, BOUNDED
BOUNDED PLACES: FREE BLACK SOCIETY IN COLONIAL NEW ORLEANS, 1769-1803 (1997).

A

HIS-

LIVES,

37.
Rebecca J. Scott, Public Rights and Private Commerce: A Nineteenth-Century Atlantic
Creole Itinerary, 48 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY 237-49 (2007).
38.

JEAN-CHARLES HOUZEAU, MY PASSAGE AT THE NEW ORLEANS TRIBUNE:

THE CIVIL WAR ERA

A

MEMOIR OF

(David C. Rankin ed., Gerard F. Denault trans., 1984).

39.
Scott, supra note 37, at 241 (quoting a letter from Tinchant to General Miximo G6mez).
For more on Tinchant, see Rebecca J. Scott & Jean M. Hdbrard, Les papiers de la liberti: Une mire
africaine et ses enfants 6 I'spoque de la rivolution haitienne, GENhSES, March 2007, at 18-25.
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and "social rights" as interchangeable. But by the 1860s, the phrase "social
rights" had become associated with a claim to "social equality"-an expression of positive aspiration in 1848 France, but generally employed as a term
of opprobrium in the nineteenth-century United States.40
As recent residents of a slave society, many of the delegates retained a
keen understanding of the ways in which one's treatment in public was decisive for one's honor. By framing their claims to equal access to public
transportation and public accommodation within the rubric of public rights
rather than social rights, Louisiana activists of the 1860s could both assert
their status as honorable citizens and try to avoid the charge that they were
claiming "social equality" in matters of intimate or private life. Although
any scheme that divides rights into fixed categories is to some extent artificially neat, a great deal was at stake in these distinctions. 4' To use the phrase
"public rights" was to emphasize those forms of equality manifested in the
public sphere. This might amount to the same thing as what others called
"social rights," but it distanced the claim from the overtones of enforced
intimacy and intrusion into private space that the term "social equality" had
42
come to connote.
The language of public rights could appeal to bilingual Creole men of
color, to English-speaking former slaves, and to white Republicans, giving a
name to the dignitary dimension of public life that they knew quite well.
Denials of access to public transportation in Union-occupied New Orleans
in 1863, for example, had been much more than the perpetuation of "custom." A man of color in Union uniform shoved off a streetcar knew the
meaning of the gesture, whether the perpetrator was an ex-Confederate or a
white Union soldier. Edouard Tinchant had been thus treated, and he later
reasserted his affronted honor in a detailed letter to the editor of the New
Orleans Tribune. In that letter Tinchant invoked his personal integrity, his
military service, and a recent opinion on citizenship issued by U.S. Attorney
General Edward Bates.43

40. On the charge of "social equality" as a label to disqualify proposals to the Louisiana
constitutional convention of 1867-68, see OFFICIAL JOURNAL, supra note 21, at 277. A small number of radical antislavery activists in the North did embrace the concept of social equality, along
with an aspiration to friendship across the color line. See STAUFFER, supra note 22, at 8-44.
41. On the variability of schemes of rights, see RICHARD A. PRIMUS, THE AMERICAN LANGUAGE OF RIGHTS 124-26, 127-76 (1999).
42. The battle over the phrase "social equality" emerged in many Reconstruction contexts,
and was closely associated with thinking about gender and sexuality. See HANNAH ROSEN, TERROR
IN THE HEART OF FREEDOM: CITIZENSHIP, SEXUAL VIOLENCE, AND THE MEANING OF RACE IN THE
POSTEMANCIPATION SOUTH (forthcoming 2008); Barbara Y. Welke, When All the Women Were

White, and All the Blacks were Men: Gender, Class, Race, and the Road to Plessy, 1855-1914, 13 L.
& HIST. REV. 261, 261-316. A full analysis of the concept and label "social equality" is beyond the
scope of this Article. As specialists in African American history have demonstrated, however, the
negative connotations of "social equality" as a framing device led even quite radical thinkers to
eschew the term. W.E.B. Du Bois makes this point most vividly in W.E.B. Du Bois, On Being
Crazy, 26 CRISIS 55, 55 (1923).
43. Tinchant's letter appeared in the French-language pages of the New Orleans Tribune,
July 21, 1864. On the "protectable legal interest" in defense of one's honor under French law, see
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English-speaking conservatives, by contrast, professed to find the concept of public rights utterly incoherent. They argued that in the proposed
language for the state constitution, "social equality is attempted to be enforced, and the right of citizens to control their own property is attempted to
be taken from them for the benefit of the colored race."" William H. Cooley,
a judge and conservative Republican, furiously opposed the language and
insisted that individuals could not be the carriers of such rights: "Because, I
never heard the term 'public rights' mentioned as a private one, and because
I cannot understand the idea of a private individual exercising public
rights. 45
In a sense, Judge Cooley's bafflement was warranted. "Public rights" as
individual rights were undoubtedly absent from the curriculum when he
studied law, even in the famously mixed civil law-common law jurisdiction of
Louisiana. 46 The words "public" and "rights" were indeed used together in the
Anglo-American tradition, in particular by the English jurist Sir William
Blackstone, for whom "public rights" referred to the broad interest of the public at large in being protected against criminal acts. But for Blackstone,
individual rights of citizens or subjects varied depending on status and office.47 The activists of Reconstruction Louisiana, by contrast, used the
phrase "public rights" to invoke, on the basis of individual dignity, a whole
range of rights including what we would now characterize as equal access to
public accommodations and common carriers. Cooley, for his part, was opposed not only to the concept but also to the evident egalitarian purpose of
the invocation of "public rights." By renaming and denouncing this notion
of public respect, calling it "social equality," Cooley and his allies sought to
deny that any judicially cognizable claim could be attached to it.
As even the irascible Judge Cooley would have known, however, at least
some elements of the public rights concept did have a counterpart in AngloAmerican common law, namely the "duty to serve" that a tradesman or corporation incurred when offering a service to the public. 48 Prior to 1865,
some courts had viewed forced separation of passengers on common carriers on the basis of color as a violation of this common law duty; many

James Q. Whitman, Enforcing Civility and Respect: Three Societies, 109 YALE L.J. 1279, 12791398 (2000).
44.
45.

supra note 21, at 290.
Id- at 117 (emphasis omitted); see also id. at 275-277.
OFFICIAL JOURNAL,

46. On various complexities of this mixture, see VERNON VALENTINE PALMER, THE LOUISIANA
CIVILIAN EXPERIENCE: CRITIQUES OF CODIFICATION IN A MIXED JURISDICTION (2005).
47. See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND ch. I (Univ.
of Chicago Press 1979) (1769); William J. Novak, The Legal Transformation of Citizenship in Nineteenth-CenturyAmerica, in THE DEMOCRATIC EXPERIMENT 85, 95 (Meg Jacobs et al. eds., 2003).
48. The classic formulation can be found in 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 47, at 348: "if an
inn-keeper, or other victualler, hangs out a sign and opens his house for travellers, it is an implied
engagement to entertain all persons who travel that way .... " See also BARBARA YOUNG WELKE,
RECASTING AMERICAN LIBERTY: GENDER, RACE, LAW, AND THE RAILROAD REVOLUTION, 18651920, at 323-75 (2001).
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others had let it stand as a "reasonable regulation. 4 9 The Union victory now
opened the question back up, and Judge Cooley and his allies hoped that by
invoking the rights of private property and the danger of "social equality"
they could fend off legislation guaranteeing equal access.
After long wrangling over the language, the time for decision on the new
state bill of rights arrived. On December 26, 1867, the twenty-fourth day of
the convention, schoolteacher Edouard Tinchant moved to endorse attorney
Simeon Belden's proposal that article I should read, "all men are created
free and equal." The proposal passed, 57 to 11. Then Thomas H. Isabelle, a
Union veteran and man of color, proposed to add the term "public" after the
word "political" in the list of rights guaranteed in article II. His amendment
passed by a vote of 59 to 16.50 In their constitutional moment, the delegates
showed conceptual flexibility and linguistic ingenuity. The overlap between
Anglo-American common law and continental concepts of equality, including the language used by Pellegrino Rossi, meant that the phrase "public
rights" was both intelligible and coherent to members of the FrancophoneAnglophone coalition in the state convention. At a purely practical level, the
new Louisiana Constitution aimed to wipe out the invidious distinctions
based on color that had pervaded the Louisiana Civil Code and subsequent
legislation; the bill of rights was one tool toward that end." At the same
time, this bill of rights asserted a key portion of the "emancipationist" legacy of the Civil War and filled out the idea of equal rights as part of state
citizenship, all the more important in light of the ambiguous and incomplete
definition of the rights attached to national citizenship in the Fourteenth
Amendment."
The 1868 constitution left undefined the full scope of the guarantee to
all citizens of the same "public rights and privileges." But article XIII of the
bill of rights stated that all persons "shall enjoy equal rights and privileges
upon any conveyance of a public character."53 It went on to specify that
all places of business, or of public resort, or for which a license is required
by either State, parish or municipal authority, shall be deemed places of a
public character, and shall be opened to the accommodation and patronage

49. For an erudite examination of this question, see Joseph William Singer, No Right to
Exclude: Public Accommodations and Private Property, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 1283 (1996). For a
sociolegal interpretation of the rise of racial segregation in rail travel, with attention to the construct
of "social equality," see Kenneth W. Mack, Law, Society, Identity and the Making of the Jim Crow
South: Travel and Segregation on Tennessee Railroads, 1875-1905, 24 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 377

(1999).
OFFICIAL JOURNAL, supra note 21, at 1 14-18; see also TUNNELL, supra note 21, at 11750.
19 (analyzing roll call votes on these questions). On Thomas Isabelle, see ERIC FONER, FREEDOM'S
LAWMAKERS: A DIRECTORY OF BLACK OFFICEHOLDERS DURING RECONSTRUCTION 115 (2d ed.

1996).
51.

On the early Code Noir and the later Civil Code, see PALMER, supra note 46, at 23, 62-

65, 71, 101-34.

52.

For a careful tracing of the "emancipationist" thread in post-Civil War thought, see
(2001).

DAVID BLIGHT, RACE AND REUNION: THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICAN MEMORY

53.

OFFICIAL JOURNAL, supra note

21, at 294.
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of all 5 4persons, without distinction or discrimination on account of race or
color.

In effect, the guarantee that all citizens would enjoy the same public
rights had a double meaning. It invoked specific rights to equal treatment in
public places and equal access to public services, and it implied that whatever other rights or privileges might subsequently be deemed "public"
would apply equally to all citizens.55 This formula had no precise equivalent
in the constitutions of the other reconstructed states, though a few came
close. Virginia's 1868 bill of rights, for example, held that "all citizens in the
State are hereby declared to possess equal civil and political rights and public privileges. 56 Louisiana stood at the forefront in making public rights
explicit, but the concept was not a Creole idiosyncrasy. Its core components
would be reformulated in federal legislation, and the phrase itself
7 would
appear four years later in the Republican Party's national platform.5
II.

LITIGATING IN DEFENSE OF EQUAL "PUBLIC RIGHTS"

By the time that the new Louisiana Constitution went into effect in
1868, the idea of equal public rights had become tightly linked to a broad
and inclusive concept of United States citizenship. Like many radical Republicans in other states, Louisiana activists viewed the Fourteenth
Amendment as recognition of a set of claims to citizenship that had always
been legitimate, not simply as the conferring of citizenship on men and
women of color at the moment of ratification. 58 The argument for an inclusive national citizenship had a long pedigree in Louisiana, dating back to the
era of the Founders, when article III of the 1803 Louisiana Purchase Treaty
guaranteed those who had been under French rule access to all the rights
and privileges of citizens of the United States. President Jefferson had tried
to ignore this promise and maneuvered adroitly to defeat the citizenship
claims of the men of color serving in the militia, but the Treaty would none-

54.

Id.

55. In 1872, for example, state delegates to the Republican convention struggled over the
nomination of Aristide Mary, a man of color, for the office of governor. As Rodolphe Desdunes later
emphasized, at stake here was not the politics of the particular nomination, but the right of such a
man to be a candidate for public office. RODOLPHE L. DESDUNES, NOS HOMMES ET NOTRE HISTOIRE:

183-84
(1911) ("[Je dirai que les partisans d'Aristide Mary ont revendiqud le droit d'aspirerau poste de
gouverneur, mais qu'ils n'ont pas convoit6 le poste m~me." ["Iwould say that the supporters of
Aristide Mary were claiming the right to aspire to the post of governor, but that they did not seek
the post itself."]).
NOTICES BIOGRAPHIQUES ACCOMPAGNEES DE REFLEXIONS ET DE SOUVENIRS PERSONNELS

56.

VA. CONST. art.

I, § 20.

57.
See KIRK H. PORTER & DONALD BRUCE JOHNSON, NATIONAL PARTY PLATFORMS, 18401956, at 47 (1956) (describing the 1872 platform); id. at 54 (describing the 1876 platform, which
called on Congress and the executive branch to secure "to every American citizen complete liberty
and exact equality in the exercise of all civil, political, and public fights").
58.
For a careful exploration of the competing interpretations of the Fourteenth Amendment
as either a new citizenship, or the recognition of an unjustly denied prior citizenship, see Richard A.
Primus, The Riddle of Hiram Revels, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1681 (2006).
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theless be invoked in the rhetoric of men of color throughout the ensuing
decades.59
These claims had been reinforced by the wartime opinion of U.S. Attorney General Bates, who in 1862 issued a far-reaching ruling that people of
color should be understood to be citizens of the United States. Creole activists in New Orleans quickly seized upon this decision and published it on
the front page of their newspaper, l'Union, to strengthen their claims to both
public and political rights. The future delegate to the 1867-68 convention
Edouard Tinchant publicly quoted the Bates ruling in 1864 in a vigorous
defense of a deep set of citizenship rights that transcended not only the errors of the Dred Scott decision but also the hesitations of many federal
officials and Union officers. Tinchant himself had been born in France, but
he believed himself to have achieved the equivalent of "letters of naturalization" in the United States through his service in the Union army in defense
of New Orleans against a potential Confederate attack.6' In the heady atmosphere of wartime Louisiana, the content of citizenship could be seen to
be expanding, along with eligibility for it.
Once the 1868 Louisiana Constitution was drafted and ratified under the
terms of congressional Reconstruction, the Louisiana Supreme Court made
earlier precedents explicit by ruling that "[b]y the treaty whereby Louisiana
was acquired, the free colored inhabitants of Louisiana were admitted to
citizenship of the United States., 62 At stake in this 1872 case was the "private right" of an antebellum free man of color to hold land, not his "public
rights." But the ruling reflected the longstanding belief of free Creoles of
color that they held a promise of citizenship rights from the very moment of

59.

Article III of the Treaty of Cession reads:

The inhabitants of the ceded territory shall be incorporated in the Union of the United States
and admitted as soon as possible according to the principles of the federal Constitution to the
enjoyment of all the rights, advantages and immunities of citizens of the United States, and, in
the mean time they shall be maintained and protected in the free enjoyment of their liberty,
property and the Religion which they profess.

Cession of Louisiana, U.S.-Fr., Apr. 30, 1803, 1803 U.S.T. 10, reprinted in REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO His EXCELLENCY W. W. HEARD, GOVERNOR OF THE STATE OF LOUISIANA 45-48
(1902). Its importance to subsequent generations of activists is discussed in BELL, supra note 26, at
29-40.
60. The decision by Bates arose from a dispute over the citizenship claims of ship captains
who were men of color. To the Secretary of the Treasury, 10 Op. Att'y Gen. 382, 382-83 (1862).
61. See Importante D&ision, L'UNION, Dec. 25, 1862, at Al; Edouard Tinchant, Letter to
the Editor, LA TRIB., July 21, 1864, at 2 ("[N]6 Frangais, nous avons gagn6 [leis lettres de naturalisation amrricaine sur les [remiparts de la Nouvelle OrlEans, debout, l'arme [au] bras, au pied du
drapeau des Etats-Unis pour llelquel nous 6tions prets a verser la demire goutte de notre sang;
quelle est donc la puissance [h]umaine qui peut nous nier notre titre de citoyen amrricain." [[B]om
French, I earned my naturalization papers on the ramparts of New Orleans, upright, with my weapon
in my hand, at the foot of the flag of the United States, prepared to spill the last drop of my blood;
what then is the human power that could deny my title to American citizenship?]). The available
microfilm edition is made from a tom copy; material in square brackets is inferred. I thank Diana
Williams for alerting me to the existence of this letter.
62.

Walsh v. Lallande, 25 La. Ann. 188, 189 (1873).
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63

Louisiana's acquisition. Present at the creation, as it were, people of color
could claim a right to be seen as full members of civil society and the public
sphere. The historical argument for national citizenship had been articulated
by free people of color in the state long before the Fourteenth Amendment
was drafted. Its ratification vindicated their sense of rights; it did not create
it._
Louisiana's 1868 organic law, in turn, had given precise content to the
longstanding ideals of equal citizenship. The attribution to all citizens of
"the same civil, political and public rights and privileges" provided the basic
framework, while article XIII spelled out the details of the right to equal
treatment. Thus, when Mrs. Josephine Decuir found herself denied access
to the ladies' stateroom on the steamer GovernorAllen in July of 1872, she
had a basis on which to bring suit under the state constitution and subse66
quent state statutes.
Josephine Decuir's experience on the steamboat encapsulated the humiliation of "customary" racial segregation and exposed the fiction of
consent on which it rested. John Cedilot, the steward on the GovernorAllen,
was by his own account a Frenchman raised in Louisiana. He viewed the
separation of white and "colored" passengers to be a reasonable response to
the preferences of white passengers. But when it fell to him to enforce the
rules against Mrs. Decuir by denying her a ladies' cabin, the situation became awkward. His job was to provide passengers with supper and a berth
on this overnight journey from New Orleans to Pointe Coupre. He struggled
to persuade Mrs. Decuir to accept a berth in the windowless "colored bureau" or, failing that, in the "saloon" located below the "recess," a
thoroughfare used by nursemaids and their charges. She refused. He offered
to bring her supper in her chair. She refused. The otherwise deferential
steward seems to have been no match for this well-dressed widow stubbornly defending her own dignity. Try as he might, he could not persuade
her to consent to her own humiliation--even in return for a plate of fried
61
oysters and warm rolls.

63. The Louisiana Supreme Court was ruling on the retrospective citizenship claim of
Charles Lallande, who had lost claim to a piece of property in 1860 when a land office commissioner judged that as a "free negro" he had no right to hold property under the pre-emption laws of
1841. See id. at 188-89. The language of the case is, among other things, a nice technical rebuttal of
Chief Justice Taney's argument in the Dred Scott decision that people of color had never held national citizenship in the era of the founders. Jd. at 189-90.
64. See BELL, supra note 26, at 41-64. On the educational institutions that helped to nurture
these claims of right, see Mary Niall Mitchell, "A Good and Delicious Country": Free Children of
Color and How The' Learned to Imagine the Atlantic World in Nineteenth-Century Louisiana,HIST.
EDUC. Q., Summer 2000, at 123.
65.

LA. CONST. tit. I, arts. II, XIII (1868).

66. The testimony from this case at the state level is transcribed in Transcript of Record, Hall
v. Decuir. 95 U.S. 485 (1877) (No. 294). The manuscript originals of the state case are in the Supreme Court of Louisiana Collection, Department of Archives and Manuscripts, Earl K. Long
Library, University of New Orleans.
67. Id. at 51. On the question of women's particular claims to respect and respectability, see
Welke, supra note 42.
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Mrs. Decuir was on a journey to deal with legal matters in the case of
her late husband's inheritance and thus happened to be accompanied by an
attorney, who could later testify that the employees of the steamer had told
him that their refusal of a stateroom was based on her perceived color. Mrs.
Decuir's invocation of her class standing (her husband had been a planter,
and her brother was now state treasurer), as well as her performance of
feminine delicacy, give the case a quaint tone compared to the egalitarianism of twentieth-century sit-ins. But the underlying point was much the
same: by refusing to accept forced segregation presented as custom, Mrs.
Decuir framed her claim within article XIII of the Louisiana Constitution
and state statutes protecting the right of any well-behaved female citizen to
61
pay for and receive a stateroom in the ladies' cabin.
Under the Louisiana Constitution, Mrs. Decuir was in the right, and the
state Supreme Court awarded her $1,000 and court costs. Like the male
plaintiffs in similar Louisiana cases involving admission to a coffee house
and to a theater, she obtained redress under state law. The heirs of the owners of the steamboat, however, appealed the case to the U.S. Supreme Court.
In a somewhat forced interpretation of the Commerce Clause, the Supreme
Court ruled that even though her journey had been entirely within the State
of Louisiana, the state constitution's prohibition of segregation on a steamboat constituted an undue interference with interstate commerce, thereby
violating the Federal Constitution. The Court thus awarded victory to the
captain's heirs and undermined the capacity of Louisiana to enforce its own
antidiscrimination statutes.69
Louisiana's 1868 constitutional framework provided a particularly explicit basis for legal challenges to forced segregation, but citizens of other
states had framed their claims in similar language, drawing on both common
law and state and federal statutes. In 1872, the national Republican Party
had called for legislation to establish "complete liberty and exact equality in
the enjoyment of all civil, political, and public rights" and sought to remind
Congress and the courts that the "recent amendments to the national Constitution should be cordially sustained because they are right, not merely
tolerated because they are laws. ' 70 During discussion of the proposed 1875
Federal Civil Rights Act, one man from Ohio wrote that "[s]ocial equality
68. Mrs. Decuir, who had lived twelve years in France, was a strong-minded woman. On an
earlier journey, she had planted herself firmly in a rocking chair in the ladies' cabin. The distressed
captain had a "note" conveyed to her telling her to leave. She responded by "summoning" the captain and trying to shame him into letting her remain. Transcript of Record. Decuir, 95 U.S. 485 (No.
294).
69. Decuir, 95 U.S. at 488-91, rev'g, Decuir v. Benson, 27 La. Ann. 1 (1875). For other
challenges brought under the 1868 Constitution and the subsequent Civil Rights Act of 1869, see
Sauvinet v. Walker, 27 La. Ann. 14 (1875) (upholding a district court grant of damages to the civil
sheriff of the parish of Orleans, who had been refused service at a coffeehouse), and Joseph v.
Bidwell, 28 La. Ann. 382 (1876) (upholding ruling granting damages to a man refused entrance to a
theater). See also ROGER A. FISCHER, THE SEGREGATION STRUGGLE IN LOUISIANA, 1862-77, at 8087 (1974).
70. FRANCIS H. SMITH, PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL UNION REPUBLICAN CONVENTION
HELD AT PHILADELPHIA, JUNE 5 AND 6, 1872, at 51 (1872).
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seems to be the bugbear at which American justice is frightened, and the
colored man denied many public privileges accorded to other American citizens."'7 The 1875 Act is now remembered mainly for having been
overturned by the Supreme Court in the 1883 Civil Rights Cases, but while
it was in effect, it provided a lever with which men and women in states like
Maryland could attack segregation on the railroads." The Republican Party
platform in 1876 again called for "complete liberty and exact equality in the
exercise of all civil, political and public rights. 73
With the federal government's retreat from Reconstruction in 1877,
however, Louisiana's self-avowed white supremacists took control of the
state through the Democratic Party. In 1878-79, the new state legislature
drafted and promulgated a constitution in which the phrase "civil, political,
and public rights" no longer appeared. The principle of racial separation in
the schools also7 4made a discreet appearance through the funding of an allblack university.
In practice, the affronts to men and women of color in public spaces
multiplied, and a statutory basis for appeals for damages or redress no
longer existed. The struggle for public voice continued, however, both in the
city and the countryside. Defending the Reconstruction-era conception of
public rights after the defeat of Reconstruction itself was not merely the
province of urban activists; it was a matter of importance to thousands of
Louisianans of African descent, for whom the ability to travel freely and to
gather in public were the bedrock for claims-making of various forms. Local
activists like the blacksmith Pierre Carmouche in Donaldsonville and the
schoolteacher Junius Bailey in Thibodaux turned their skills toward organizing for the Knights of Labor and drafting collective communications to the
sugar planters' organization. In late November of 1887, a huge strike swept
through the sugar fields. The strike was crushed when the governor deployed the now all-white militia to force strikers out of their homes on the
plantation, and vigilantes organized to confront the workers when they took
refuge in the towns.75

71. Patrick 0. Gudridge, Privileges and Permissions:The Civil Rights Act of 1875, 8
PHIL. 83, 125 (1989).
72.

LAW

&

On Maryland test cases under the federal Act, see Libby Benton, Claims to Rights Under

the Civil Rights Act of 1875 (Apr. 24, 2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). On

Tennessee, where common law claims were the preferred strategy, see Mack, supra note 49.
73.

M.A.

CLANCY, PROCEEDINGS OF THE REPUBLICAN NATIONAL CONVENTION

HELD AT

CINCINNATI, OHIO JUNE 14, 15, AND 16, 1876, at 56 (1876).

74. See LA. CONST. art. CCXXXI (1879). Rodolphe Desdunes was furious that the few remaining black legislators had accepted the offer of a separate university: "C'dtait la fin. L'homme de
couleur avait accept6 la subordination 1dgale, c'est-A-dire l'id6e d'&re trait6 conventionellement et
non constitutionellement." ["It was the end. Men of color had accepted legal subordination, that is,
the idea of being treated according to custom rather than according to the constitution."] DESDUNES,
supra note 55, at 181.
75.

See REBECCA J. ScoTr, DEGREES OF FREEDOM:

LOUISIANA AND CUBA AFTER SLAVERY

61-94 (2005); Rebecca J. Scott, "Stubborn and Disposed to Stand their Ground": Black Militia,
Sugar Workers, and the Dynamics of Collective Action in the Louisiana Sugar Bowl, 1863-1887,
SLAVERY & ABOLITION, April 1999, at 103, 104.
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The withdrawal of federal support for Louisiana's Republicans and for
its citizens of color did not mean that they ceased entirely to be heard.
Moreover, the courts' refusal to support their public rights did not prevent
these citizens from acting in public as bearers of such rights. Indeed, such
public displays of a claim to equality were precisely the
76 target at which the
Louisiana legislature aimed the 1890 Separate Car Law.
III.

ORGANIZING THE

Plessy CHALLENGE

In a post-slavery society in which large numbers of former slaves and
their descendants did not possess the skills of reading and writing, it might
seem difficult to nurture an oppositional movement centered on formal
rights and legal claims-making. But through what Armando Petrucci has
referred to as the "delegation of writing," the oral claims of many people of
color of modest birth were routinely transformed into legal language by
skilled members of the community." The legal systems of both France and
Spain had long attributed a central role in private law to the legal practitioner known as a notaire (escribano in Spanish), and the State of Louisiana
had retained the public notary as an essential actor in the legal system.
Charged with formalizing and recording consensual understandings, the
notary conferred enforceability at law on a multitude of transactions. He
was a key figure in the branch of private law designated "non-contentious,"
giving authenticity to texts and conferring "executory force" on their stipulations, without the necessity of court action. Notarial acts could also be
drawn upon in court proceedings if the matter at hand moved into the realm
of the "contentious.""' Under Louisiana law, the notary, with his duty to
serve all who sought him out, brought formal writing within the reach of
ordinary people and was legally obliged to transcribe and retain for future
reference the full text of most of the documents that he notarized.79
In New Orleans, at the nexus between these everyday practices of writing and the larger campaign for public rights, was an intriguing individual:
Louis A. Martinet, notary public. Martinet's mother was a Louisiana-born
woman of color and his father was apparently a Belgian immigrant. After
the Civil War, Martinet attended Straight University Law School, obtained
admission to the bar, and, a decade later, acquired certification as a notary. 80
It was in the tense post-Reconstruction environment of 1888 that Louis
Martinet opened his office as a notary public on Exchange Alley, in the

76.
On the political context in which the legislation was passed, see KEITH WELDON MEDLEY, WE AS FREEMEN: Plessy v. Ferguson (2003).

77.

See Armando Petrucci, Escribir para otros, in PETRUCCI,

ALFABETISMO, ESCRITURA,

SOCIEDAD 105-16 (1999).

78.

See AUBERT, supra note 28, § 179, at 180-81 (discussing the notary as a public officer).

79.
For the general regulations governing notaries and their records, see CIVIL CODE OF
LOUISIANA: REVISION OF 1870 WITH AMENDMENTS TO 1947, arts. 2234, 2251-66 (Joseph Dainow
ed., 1947).
80.

For biographical information on Martinet, see MEDLEY, supra note 76, at 150-58.
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commercial district of New Orleans. The pluralism and public character of
the office of the notary gave it a particular importance. The ratification of
the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution had
made it clear that former slaves, their descendants, and others of African
ancestry would now unequivocally have juridical personality, becoming subjects of law, not the objects of property transactions. But by the 1880s, the
restoration of white supremacy in Louisiana was well underway. If the juridical capacity of persons of color was in theory equal to that of other
citizens, as a practical matter they often faced severe hostility in the courts.
The notary's office, however, remained a place where some of the benefits
of law could be invoked outside of the gaze of juries and the judiciary.
Martinet's reach, moreover, extended from downtown New Orleans outward
to the lively multiracial community of Faubourg Trem6, where his colleagues Homer Plessy, shoemaker, and Rodolphe Desdunes, schoolteacher
and cigar-seller, lived."'
As Kathryn Bums has phrased it, the function of the notary was to pour
meaning into the molds provided by law, precedent, and handbooks, producing texts to serve the needs of his clients.8 2 Among Louis Martinet's clients,
these needs included the preparation of documents making property transactions official, establishing and cancelling mortgages and other loans, and
providing for inheritance by will. The notary also formalized families' decisions on the care of an infirm relative and issued powers of attorney. As a
result, the volumes of documents transcribed by Martinet reveal a web of
interactions among people of differing degrees of literacy and prosperity,
Catholic and Protestant, former slave and long-free. Although many of his
clients were men and women who could have been categorized as "colored,"
Martinet rarely employed color terms of any kind, except when those coming before him explicitly chose to invoke African ancestry.83
Martinet routinely documented the establishment of mutual aid societies, giving legal recognition to various forms of social solidarity.84 On
October 3, 1890, for example, three months after the Louisiana legislature
passed the Separate Car Law, a group of eight women appeared before
Martinet. They wished to incorporate legally as a mutual aid society under
the name La Dignit6, or Dignity. They committed themselves to providing
medical assistance to their members and, when necessary, a funeral and burial, and they set procedures for the calling of meetings and the elections of
81.

See id. at 33-34, 159 (discussing the residences of Plessy and Desdunes).

82.

See Kathryn Bums, Notaries, Truth, and Consequences, AM. HiST.

REV., Apr.

2005, at

110.
83. These characterizations are based on a review of the indices and many of the acts recorded in Martinet's notarial records, which are in the New Orleans Notarial Archives Research
Center ("NONARC"). For a detailed analysis, see Rebecca J. Scott, Se Battre Pour Ses Droits: Ecritures, Litiges et Discrimination Raciale en Louisiane (1888-1899), 53/54 CAHIERS Du BRIISIL
CONTEMPORAIN 182-209 (2003), and SCOTT, supra note 75, at 75, 88, 161, 172, 200.
84. Under Louisiana law, a notary recorded the formation of societies and transcribed their
bylaws. Formal recognition came by depositing these texts with state officials. For examples, see the
notations to I NOTARIAL ACTS OF Louis MARTINET (1890) in NONARC.
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officers. Most striking is the provision that all of their subsequent documents were to be stamped using a copper emblem bearing the word
"Dignit6." These women were explicitly asserting their dignified public
presence, in life as in death."
These expressions of dignity and equal public standing in the office of
Louis Martinet, public notary, provide us with an appropriate vantage
point from which to view the Plessy challenge itself. In July of 1890 the
Louisiana legislature passed Act No. 11l, designated, "An act to promote
the comfort of passengers on railway trains; requiring all railway companies
carrying passengers on their trains, in this State, to provide equal but separate accommodations for the white and colored races." It held that "the
officers of such passenger trains shall have power and are hereby required to
assign each passenger to the coach or compartment used for the race to
which such passenger belongs." Entry into a coach other than the one assigned by the officer was a criminal offense, punishable by a fine of twentyfive dollars or not more than twenty days in the parish prison. 86
In response to this blow to equal public rights, Louis Martinet, Paul
Bonseigneur, Rodolphe Desdunes, and others founded the Citizens' Committee for the Annulment of Act No. 111, commonly known as the Separate
Car Law, and expanded their newspaper the Crusaderto raise money and
publicize their campaign. Some of those joining with the Committee, including teachers, traders, and artisans, had come of age in the era of
Louisiana's radical 1868 constitution with its ringing claim of equal public
rights. Others were younger, but recalled that constitution as a moment of
principled triumph in the generation of their parents."'
The networks and solidarities registered in Martinet's notarial records
would underlie and reinforce the Committee's litigation. Many of these organizations and their counterparts in the countryside contributed to what
was called "Mr. Desdunes' stocking," the fund to support the Crusaderand
the lawsuits. The schoolteacher Alice E. Hampton, who taught at the
Donaldsonville Academy upriver in Ascension Parish, put in her fifty cents
in July of 1895, along with dimes and quarters collected from dozens of
young women, despite its being "so hot going to and coming from school
85.

Act No. 6, Chartre "La Dignit6" Soci&t d'Assistance Mutuelle (Oct. 3, 1890), in I No(1890) in NONARC. Each of the women signed in her own hand.
"Dignit6" had been a key term in the lexicon of France's 1848 republican revolution. One didactic
text emphasized that "une R(publique est l'6tat qui concilie le mieux les int~rts et ladignit6 de
chacun avec les int6r~ts et ladignit6 de tout lemonde." ["A Republic is the state that best reconciles
the interests and the dignity of each with the interests and dignity of all."] CHARLES RENOUVIER,
MANUEL RtPUBLICAIN DE L'HOMME ET DU CITOYEN 93 (Gamier Fr&res ed., 1981) (1848).
TARIAL ACTS OF Louis MARTINET

86.
Act of July 10, 1980, No. II, 1890 La. Acts 152, 152-53, reprinted in Record of Case
at 6-7, Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (No. 15,248).

87. See DESDUNES, supra note 55, at 165-67, on the "generation of 1860." On support in the
countryside, see SCOTT, supra note 75, at 90-91. See also Joseph Logsdon & Lawrence Powell,
Rodolphe Lucien Desdunes: Forgotten Organizer of the Plessy Protest, in SUNBELT REVOLUTION:
THE HISTORICAL PROGRESSION OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS STRUGGLE IN

THE GULF SOUTH,

1866-2000,

at 42, 56 (Samuel C. Hyde, Jr. ed., 2003); and the CRUSADER, June 1895 (on file with Archives,
Xavier University of Louisiana Library, New Orleans, La., available in the Crusader clippings file in
Special Collections).
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every day" that she had found it hard to do her "whole duty." Her neighbor
Pierre Carmouche, the blacksmith and former Knights of Labor organizer,
gathered funds from his colleagues in a mutual-aid society called the True
Friends 88
.
In claiming the right to equal treatment on public transportation, the organizers of the Plessy challenge were well aware of the power of
"customary" forms of racism to continue to inhibit their public practices,
with or without a Separate Car Law. But they were determined to try to prevent the central tenet of white supremacist ideology from being enforced by
the law. Public rights, with their intimate connection to public standing,
were a key component of honorable citizenship. If they fell, civil and political rights were at increased risk as well.
The story of the Plessy test case itself has been carefully told by several
authors who have reconstructed the process by which first Daniel Desdunes,
musician, and then Homer Plessy, shoemaker and Freemason, stepped forward to test the constitutionality of Louisiana's Separate Car Law.
Desdunes, who had purchased an interstate ticket, successfully invoked a
recent ruling based on the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution that
barred Louisiana's legislature from regulating carriers traveling between
Louisiana and Alabama. For a moment the Committee of Citizens dared to
exult, "Jim Crow is Dead!"; but the ruling in the Desdunes case did not address the broader claims of individual rights. By careful pre-arrangement,
Homer Plessy had bought a ticket on the East Louisiana Railroad from New
Orleans to Covington, Louisiana, and taken a seat in the "white" car, where
he was confronted by the conductor and removed from the train. He had
then been arrested, arraigned, and released on bond. The Committee vowed
that they would "exhaust all remedies which the laws of our country allow
to its citizens for a redress of grievances. 89
Over the next four years, the case made its way through the courts on a
writ of prohibition challenging the constitutionality of the Separate Car Law.
When it reached the United States Supreme Court, Plessy was represented
by J.C. Walker, a Louisiana attorney, and by Albion Tourgre, the eloquent
novelist, Republican activist, Union veteran, and former judge. 90 Their briefs
built on both the Thirteenth and the Fourteenth Amendments and made a
variety of ingenious arguments about the indeterminacy of race and the

88. On these fundraising efforts, see the clippings from the CRUSADER, supra note 87, especially June 22, 1895, and July 12-20, 1895. See also MEDLEY, supra note 76, at 130-31.
89.

CRUSADER,

supra note 87, reprinted in

MEDLEY,

supra note 76, at 165; see also LoF-

GREN, supra note 10. Excerpts from newspaper reports are in THE THIN DISGUISE, supra note 3, and

in the CRUSADER, supra note 87. The initial report of the detective who arrested Plessy, described
him as "being a passenger of the colored race on a train of the East Louisiana Railroad Co." Record
of Case at 4, Plessy, 163 U.S. 537 (No. 15,248).
90.

MARK ELLIOTT, COLOR-BLIND JUSTICE: ALBION TOURGfE AND THE QUEST FOR RACIAL

EQUALITY FROM THE CIVIL WAR TO

Plessy v. Ferguson(2006).
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"property" value of a reputation of whiteness.9 ' Blocked by the weight of
precedent from simply claiming a right under the Fourteenth Amendment to
freedom from discriminatory treatment, Plessy's attorneys drew attention to
the state's action in forcing the railways to discriminate. Key to the whole
structure of their claim, however, was the identification of the Separate Car
Law with the concept of caste. In language that recalled the 1868 Louisiana
Constitution's guarantee of equal access to all enterprises holding a franchise or charter from the state, the brief for Plessy argued as follows:
It is not consistent with reason that the United States, having granted and
bestowed one equal citizenship of the United States and prescribed one
equal citizenship in each state, for all, will permit a State to compel a railway conductor to assort them arbitrarily according to his ideas of race, in
the enjoyment of chartered privileges. 92
By 1896 it was no longer possible to invoke the 1868 Louisiana Constitution's bill of rights, with its guarantee to all citizens of the same "civil,
political, and public rights and privileges." That text had been replaced by
the state constitution of 1879, and the new Louisiana Supreme Court would
not interpret the new constitution as granting any such public rights. The
concepts and formulas of the 1868 Constitution nonetheless underlay the
spirit of Plessy's brief, echoed in references to "the enjoyment of chartered
privileges." The earlier terms were now re-molded to try to fit the language
of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments, and the unifying concept
was the impermissibility of caste: "The effect of a law distinguishing between citizens as to race, in the enjoyment of a public franchise is to legalize
caste and restore, in part at least, the inequality of right which was an essential incident of slavery."93
By "caste," the attorneys for Homer Plessy meant something quite different from the term as employed (for better or for worse) by twentiethcentury historians and anthropologists. Early in the period of European colonial expansion, the word casta and its variants had been used to designate
a pure or separate lineage (such as a "race" of horses or a variety of grapes).
After the French Revolution, the word could be used-pejoratively-to designate a system of privileges based on birth and rank. 94 In this latter sense,
the term caste was easily recognizable to jurists and activists in the United
States in the late nineteenth century. To argue that the Separate Car Law
91.
The argument that the actions of conductors under the law could imperil the property
interest that a man or woman might have in the reputation of whiteness is analyzed in Cheryl I.
Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1707, 1746-50 (1993).
92.

Brief for Plaintiff in Error, Plessy, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (No. 210), 1869 WL 13992, at

93.

Id. at *"14.

*11.

94. See I DICTIONNAIRE HISTORIQUE DE LA LANGUE FRANqAISE, supra note 27, at 646. By a
somewhat puzzling linguistic turn, the word also came to be applied in Spanish in the plural to
castas, those who by virtue of mixed ancestry occupied specified roles in a hierarchy of human
types in colonial society. I thank the Portuguese linguist Rita Marquilhas, of the University of
Lisbon, for her assistance in tracking the term through various Spanish and Portuguese dictionaries
from the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.
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imposed and enforced caste was to declare that law unworthy of a nation
founded on the proposition that all men are created equal.

A majority of the justices on the U.S. Supreme Court chose to ignore
virtually all of this reasoning and to accept instead the argument proffered

by the attorneys for the State of Louisiana, who presented the law as a simple exercise of the state's legitimate police power. To them, Plessy's
challenge was an illegitimate effort to gain legal backing in the pursuit of
"social equality." The language of the majority decision thus incorporated a

key tenet of white supremacist ideology-the sleight of hand through which
public rights were re-characterized as importunate social claims. These, in
turn, were associated with "social equality," with all the blurring of boundaries between public and private, the phantasms of "miscegenation," and the
dangers of social transgression that phrase could evoke.95 Persuading the
Court to participate in the white supremacists' key rhetorical elision was

perhaps the most consequential victory for the government of Louisiana in
Plessy, both in the domain of discourse and in the domain of doctrine.96
CONCLUSION

Once we define historical context to include vernacular concepts of
rights, it becomes clear that reframing the Plessy challenge to emphasize its

dignitary dimension is not an anachronism, a mere artifact of our own post-

Brown v. Board of Education consciousness.97 When the bill of rights in the
1868 Louisiana Constitution granted state citizenship to residents regardless
of race and assured all citizens of the "same civil, political, and public rights
and privileges," the choice of language reflected decades of discussion

among free persons of color in Louisiana, invigorated by the emancipationist energies of the Civil War. 98
By the time Homer Plessy took his seat in the first-class railway car in
June of 1892, he and his colleagues had been exercising important public
95. One of the few white southern observers who denounced this sleight of hand was New
Orleans resident George W. Cable, The Silent South, 30 CENTURY MAG. 647 (1885), reprinted in
GEORGE W. CABLE, THE NEGRO QUESTION: A SELECTION OF WRITINGS ON CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE
SOUTH 83, 92-96 (Arlin Turner ed., 1958).
96. Among works that follow the Court in treating Plessy as involving "social rights" are
Klarman, supra note 9, at 325, which distinguishes civil rights from social rights in the case of
school integration, and PLESSY V. FERGUSON: A BRIEF HISTORY WITH DOCUMENTS 13 (Brook Thomas ed., 1997). For convincing demonstrations that the triumvirate of civil, political, and social
rights involves a continual shifting of boundaries, see PRIMUS, supra note 41, and Mark Tushnet,
The Politics of Equality in Constitutional Law: The Equal Protection Clause, Dr. Du Bois, and
Charles Hamilton Houston, 74 J. AM. HIST. 884 (1987).
97. Klarman treats most critiques of the Plessy decision as falling into anachronism, because,
he argues, "it may be fanciful to expect the Justices to have defended black civil rights when racial
attitudes and practices were as abysmal as they were at the turn of the century." Klarman, supranote
9, at 305. In Michael J. Klarman, Rethinking the Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Revolutions, 82 VA.
L. REV. 1, 27-28 (1996), Klarman uses the idea of "dominant racial norms" to similar effect: "The
Plessy decision was, indeed, so fully congruent with the dominant racial norms of the period that it
elicited little more than a collective yawn of indifference from a nation that would have expected
precisely that result from its Supreme Court."
98.

See LA. CONST. tit. I, art. H (1868).
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rights in multiple spheres of daily life in New Orleans for decades, despite
many informally enforced practices of segregation. By their own account,
the organizers of the challenge to the Separate Car Law had staked their
personal and political identities on a claim of equal public dignity that was
incompatible with the legal recognition of caste-like distinctions. They designed the test case to highlight the ways in which the Separate Car Law
affronted that dignity. In their view, the Separate Car Law was "intended to
nullify the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution, and to subordinate the dignity of the citizen to the malice and caprice of a few
tyrant[s] and demagogues." 99
Taking public rights seriously as a concept offers several kinds of insight
into the Plessy appeal. First, it recognizes a construction of rights that was
crucial to the plaintiff and powerfully unacceptable to the defendant. Second, it helps explain the persistence of the plaintiff. To claim public rights at
law was, in effect, another way of exercising them in practice. Even as the
odds against victory mounted, the members and supporters of the Citizens'
Committee continued their campaign to demonstrate that the dignity they
asserted was indeed theirs to exercise, whatever the judicial outcome. Third,
examining the Plessy challenge in this way encourages us to link the formal
strategy of litigation with the vernacular practices of writing and legal reasoning in the larger community. Because these practices occurred in places
like the local office of the notary public, they are below the radar of most
jurisprudential analysis. But they were, in fact, part of the public legal culture in which public rights as a concept made sense.
By restoring the Plessy challenge to its precise context, we can go beyond its familiar portrayal as the effort of members of what is often
misleadingly referred to as a "light-skinned elite." The case in fact gives
evidence of a cosmopolitan activist tradition with its own broad social base
and conceptual roots in the city and the countryside of Louisiana. The
Citizens' Committee found allies among former union organizers upriver in
Donaldsonville and among 6migr6 Cuban revolutionary cigar workers in
New Orleans. The money to support the campaign came in from schoolteachers in Ascension Parish as well as from artisans and philanthropists in
the city. They knew what they were doing, even though they knew quite well
that they might not win. ' 0
For the long years of the campaign, Rodolphe Desdunes and Louis
Martinet explicated their thinking and exhorted their neighbors and supporters through their writings in the New Orleans Crusader.From further north,
their attorney Albion Tourg6e did the same on a national stage in the
Chicago Inter Ocean. But even as they were seeking to secure public rights,
the next wave of white supremacist legislation was coming up fast behind
them. Across the 1890s, one after another southern state moved to deny to
99.

MEDLEY, supra

note 76, at167 (quoting Rodolphe Desdunes in the Crusader).

100.

For a discussion of the participation of Ram6n Victor Pages, a Cuban 6migr6, see Louis
A. MARTINET, THE VIOLATION OF A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT 16 (1893), and ScoTT, supra note 75,
at 76-77.
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black men the political rights that- had seemingly been secured by the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. Many southern states had already
undertaken constitutional disfranchisement, and others were accomplishing
the same goal through statute.' O' By the time the Court issued its opinion in
Plessy, the suggestion by the majority that "political equality" was indeed
guaranteed under the Fourteenth Amendment rang very hollow.'02
Rodolphe Desdunes later reflected upon the failed Plessy challenge, and
addressed those who asserted that it would be better to remain silent than to
draw attention to the misfortunes and powerlessness of the population of
color. He disagreed: "We believe that it is more noble and worthy to fight
nonetheless, rather than to show oneself passive and resigned. Absolute
submission augments the oppressor's power and creates doubts about the
sentiment of the oppressed."'' 3 It has been the goal of this Article not only to
reconstruct some of that "sentiment," but also to trace the political philosophy and social network to which Desdunes was heir. The right to respectful
treatment in the public sphere was at the core of that philosophy, and
Louisiana's constitutional concept of equal "public rights" provided a
precedent and a jurisprudence that framed the enterprise. By bundling together "civil, political, and public rights," those who wrote the Constitution
of 1868 had been trying to assure both the long-free and the newly freed that
they would be treated as equal citizens in the public culture of the postslavery world. Private matters could, in their view, remain private, but freedom from public disrespect and exclusion as one boarded a train car or took
a seat in a caf6 was not a private matter. Honor, to use the ancient
term, and
4
dignity, to use the Republican one, depended on that respect.1
By contrast, once the Supreme Court Justices accepted white supremacists' claim that what was at stake was a presumption to "social equality,"
the next step was the easy denial that the Fourteenth Amendment guaranteed
such "social equality." It is perhaps unsurprising that powerful and relatively

101.
See J. MORGAN KOUSSER, THE SHAPING OF SOUTHERN POLITICS: SUFFRAGE RESTRICTION AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ONE-PARTY SOUTH, 1880-1910 (1974); MICHAEL PERMAN,
STRUGGLE FOR MASTERY: DISFRANCHISEMENT IN THE SOUTH, 1888-1908 (2001).
102. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 544 (1896). Justice Brown's phrasing ("[The Fourteenth Amendment] could not have been intended ...to enforce social, as distinguished from
political equality ....
") implied a constitutional guarantee of political equality, a guarantee the
Court would walk away from within the next few years, particularly in Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475
(1902). See Richard H. Pildes, Democracy, Anti-Democracy and the Canon, 17 CONST. COMMENT.
295 (2000).
103. DESDUNES, supra note 55, at 192 ("Nous croyons qu'il est plus noble et plus digne de
lutter quand m~me, que de se montrer passif etr6sign6. La soumission absolue augmente lapuissance de l'oppresseur et fait douter du sentiment de l'opprim6.").
104. Indeed, private matters could be seen as public to the extent that they conferred civil
effects. On the floor of the convention, Edouard Tinchant proposed that all women, regardless of
color, have the same right to sue for breach of promise (of marriage), and that all women be able to
compel to marriage any man with whom they had lived for a year. Louisiana's Creole activists did
not shy away from the controversial question of interracial marriage, for in a setting in which
women of color had often entered into long-term intimate relationships with men-relationships
that had little or no civic protection-the right to marriage had a strong dignitary component. See
OFFICIAL JOURNAL, supra note 21, at 192.

HeinOnline -- 106 Mich. L. Rev. 802 2007-2008

Conceptual Roots of the Plessy Challenge

March 20081

conservative white men of the 1890s took this path. But it is surprising that
modern legal and historical scholars would adopt without careful scrutiny
the "social equality" framing offered by the Democrats of late nineteenthcentury Louisiana. For the equal public rights tradition had its own history,
one that would have been immediately recognizable not only to Rodolphe
Desdunes in Louisiana, but to his predecessors Edouard Tinchant from
France and Julien Raimond from Haiti. By 1868, the idea of equal public
rights made sense to the Massachusetts-born attorney Simeon Belden, and to
the Louisiana-born former slave Thomas Isabelle. It underlay the successful
claims of plaintiffs in antidiscrimination cases in Louisiana in the 1870s.
And even into the 1880s, it was recognizable to some white men from Louisiana: George Washington Cable evoked the phrase when he wrote that "the
day must come when the Negro must share and enjoy in common with the
white race the whole scale of public rights and advantages provided under

American government." 105
Despite the revisions to the Louisiana Constitution, both the concept and
the phrase lived on into the 1890s. Ram6n Victor Pagds, the head of the union of Spanish-speaking cigar workers in New Orleans, invoked "public
rights" when he spoke to an 1893 mass meeting in support of the Citizens'
Committee.' ° And although Justice Harlan's famous dissent in Plessy did
not use the words "public rights," his claim that the Constitution "neither
knows nor tolerates classes among citizens" and thus10 "[tihere
is no caste
7
here" echoes the plaintiff's brief in its underlying logic.
Ironically, the white supremacists would themselves later drop the veil
and acknowledge that their own claims in the Plessy case had been disingenuous. As the Citizens' Committee had known all along, the Louisiana
legislature was explicitly concerned with refusing public respect to citizens
of color. In his inaugural address in 1904, Governor Newton Blanchard acknowledged that the real goal of the white supremacist project was to deny
to Louisiana's citizens of color the very essence of public dignity and recognition: "No approach towards social equality or social recognition will
ever be tolerated in Louisiana. Separate schools, separate churches, separate
cars, separate places of entertainment will be enforced. Racial distinction
and integrity must be preserved."'0 8
There it was: no "social recognition." Segregation was not merely an end
in itself; it was a means to an end, that of denying social recognition to people of color. In perceiving the Separate Car Law as an act of intentional
humiliation, as a public assertion of a fundamental inequality of standing
among the state's citizens, Homer Plessy and his allies were not, as Justice
Brown had opined, showing a prickly hypersensitivity, envisioning disrespect where none was intended. They were accurately gauging the intent of
105.

CABLE, supra

106.

For a discussion regarding Pages, see

107.

Plessy, 163 U.S. at 559.

108. SIDNEY
ANA'S GOVERNORS

note 95, at 9-10.

J. ROMERO, MY
245-46 (1980).

MARTINET,

supra note 100, at 16.

FELLOW CITIZENS: THE INAUGURAL ADDRESSES OF LouIsi-
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those who now ruled them and accurately predicting the consequences of a
loss of "public rights." After their defeat in the Supreme Court, there was
only one cold comfort for Plessy's supporters, which was to have succeeded
in using a branch of the federal government to expose the state's violation of
their rights. Like the ordinary men and women of Louisiana who formalized
their claims at the office of the notary, they had used law and writing to register their assertion of public standing. The year before their defeat,
Rodolphe Desdunes had reflected on the ironies they faced and charted the
only remaining path of action: "'It is well for a people to know their rights
even if denied them,' and we will add that it is proper and wise for people to
exercise those rights as intelligently as possible, even if robbed of their
benefits."' 9

109.
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